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C o n t e n t s
PPB No.42  2/18/99  2:46 PM  Page 3Enacting a federal minimum wage in 1938, the government sought to
guarantee that people who work would earn enough to support their
families. Today the same goal is often stated as the belief that people
who work deserve a living wage that would place them in a better finan-
cial position than they would be in if they were on public assistance.
But experience has shown that any attempt by Congress to raise the
minimum wage by even a limited amount immediately sets off a political
s t o rm. Debate centers on the extent to which there is a trade-off
between higher earnings for some workers and the loss of jobs by others
as businesses cut staff to offset increased wage rates. By the time 
wrangling over the concept of the wage itself and the size of the increase
that is feasible for legislative enactment is over, the purchasing power of
the promulgated increase has already been eroded by inflation so that it
p rovides limited benefit to minimum-wage workers. Although the
results of this erosion might be remedied by a more substantial increase,
such an increase in labor costs, which is likely to be both large and
unanticipated by businesses, may create a considerable dislocation for
f i rms that employ a large number of minimum-wage workers. In this
policy brief Resident Scholar Oren M. Levin-Waldman offers a solution
to this problem. He argues that a system of automatic adjustment of the
minimum wage could maintain its value for workers and provide busi-
nesses with information about the size and timing of further increases. 
Automatic adjustment schemes have been proposed before, but most
have linked increases to changes in the consumer price index. If the CPI
overstates or even misstates inflation so that wages might increase at a
rate higher than or diff e rent from actual inflation, the increases could
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result in inflationary pressures. A wage hike that is commensurate with
an increase in prod u c t i v i t y, however, would not exacerbate these pre s-
sures. With this in mind, Levin-Waldman proposes a system that links
the minimum wage and private sector wage rates, which reflect changes
in productivity. 
The rate at which we set the minimum and the method by which we
adjust it are important topics in the search for a solution to the problem
of the existence of a large population of the working poor, in issues of
welfare reform, and in issues of the growing disparity of income. While
those at the higher end of the income ladder have seen their income
rise, those on the lowest rung—the minimum-wage earners—have seen
smaller increases or even declines in real earnings, despite the prosperous
economy. The new welfare legislation is pushing thousands of recipients
into the workforce, and those who find work are likely to earn no more
than the minimum wage. For families making the transition from welfare
to work, surviving on the minimum wage will be difficult and will
become even more so if the value of the minimum is allowed to continue
to erode. It is worth considering options, such as the one proposed in
this brief, to ensure that workers will earn enough to provide their fami-
lies with an adequate level of well-being. 
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P roposals for raising the minimum wage are frequently brought before
Congress. A bill introduced in the summer of 1997 proposed raising the
minimum wage to $7.25 an hour by 2002. Another only a couple of
months later called for an increase to $6.65 by the year 2000. Two intro-
duced in March of this year, and currently languishing in Congre s s ,
p ropose raising the minimum from its current $5.75 to $6.15 over the
next two years. This flurry of legislative activity, along with Pre s i d e n t
C l i n t o n ’s call for an increase in his 1998 State of the Union addre s s ,
clearly indicates that policymakers recognize the difficulty of supporting a
family on a minimum wage. Yet despite this awareness, Congress seems
incapable of acting to raise the wage to a level that can lift families out of
poverty.
The difficulty in adopting an increase lies in the fact that the minimum
wage is such a divisive political issue. Proposals for an increase are imme-
diately supported by those who argue that it is impossible for families to
survive at the current rate, but the proposals are just as quickly opposed
by those who believe a higher wage will do more harm than good because
the resulting higher labor costs will force businesses to shed workers. By
the time Congress does manage to act, believing the issue to be settled
for a while, it is discovered that inflation has eroded the value of the
minimum wage, leaving it insufficient to live on, and it must be increased
again. That each hike in the wage requires an act of Congress means that
the wisdom of having a minimum wage is repeatedly re t u rned to the
political arena as the subject of debate. The ensuing battle drags on for so
long that when Congress finally does act, the political compromise results
in an increase that is far too small to have much impact on workers.
Linking the Minimum Wage 
to Prod u c t i v i t y
PPB No.42  2/18/99  2:46 PM  Page 7Automatic Adjustment of the Minimum Wa g e
Public Policy Brief 8
The best solution to this problem is to meet it head on and resolve it once
and for all. This can be done by taking the bold step of raising the
minimum wage to a rate that can lift families out of poverty and then
p roviding a mechanism for automatic adjustment of the wage. If such a
mechanism is put in place, Congress will no longer be forced to revisit the
issue periodically and the value of the wage will be maintained. Wo r k e r s ’
e a rnings would no longer be held hostage to politics.
Automatic adjustment of the minimum wage has been considered by
Congress in the past (Levin-Waldman 1998). The 1997 bill that called
for an increase to $7.25 also called for indexing the minimum wage to
the consumer price index (CPI). The minimum wage, once set, would
rise each year along with the increase in the CPI, so that it would keep
up with inflation. The principal problem with linking the minimum
wage to the CPI is that the CPI overstates the rate of inflation and may
not accurately reflect market-caused price increases. A better mecha-
nism would be one that links increases in the minimum wage to
increases in productivity.
An optimal adjustment mechanism would allow the wage to rise with
gains in productivity of minimum-wage workers and would prevent the
value of the minimum wage from eroding due to inflation. In general,
wage hikes are the result of private sector decisions about wages that are
based on past price hikes and productivity gains. Indexing the minimum
wage to some measure of overall wage gains could, there f o re, reflect a
private sector view of productivity gains. More o v e r, a wage floor itself
can lead to higher productivity; if this is the case, then allowing the
minimum wage to rise along with other wages could itself lead to produc-
tivity gains among minimum-wage workers.
State of the Minimum Wage Debate
The minimum wage, since its passage in the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) of 1938, has always been a contentious issue. The debate over the
federal minimum wage specifically and the concept of a wage floor gener-
ally has continued unabated. The argument often given in favor of
i n c reasing the minimum wage is that it has not kept pace with the general
level of wages. More o v e r, many people earning the minimum wage find
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wage hovered around 50 percent of the average hourly wage, but during
the 1980s and much of the 1990s it was often below 40 percent. The
income of a full-time worker heading a family of three and earning the
minimum was above the poverty line in 1979 (Table 1). Because the
minimum was held constant from 1981 to 1989, that worker’s income fell
to $2,300 below the poverty line by 1992, the income of a worker heading
a two-person family was $606 below the poverty line, and that of a worker
heading a family of four was $5,364 below the line. (By one estimate a
family of four must have $27,000 a year, about twice the poverty line, to
maintain a minimally adequate standard of living [Uchitelle 1998].)
An increase in the minimum would give the working poor some relief
and public assistance recipients greater incentive to work. Many on
public assistance haven’t had incentive to work because their total bene-
fits exceeded what they could earn from work, especially in minimum-
wage jobs. Increasing the minimum wage might make work more
re w a rding for those who previously shunned it (Bane and Ellwood
1994). It is also a simple matter of fairness that those who work full-time
should be able to support themselves and their families above the
p o v e rty line. Opponents to raising the minimum wage often counter
that most minimum-wage workers are not poor and that the only effect
of an increase in the minimum wage is more unemployment among
teenagers. Firms unable to pay the resulting higher labor costs will cut
back on labor, reduce benefits, or substitute technology (capital) for
labor in order to achieve greater productivity.
The results of empirical estimates of the employment effects of the
minimum wage are, when taken as a group, ambiguous at best. Much of
the empirical re s e a rch has focused on the youth labor market. It has
become the prevailing wisdom that the minimum wage takes its greatest
toll on youths, that a binding wage floor reduces employment for
younger and less-skilled workers (Kosters and Welch 1972; Welch 1974,
1978; Meyer and Wise 1983). This re s e a rch has been buttressed by a
study by a federal commission that found that a 10 percent increase in
the minimum wage leads to a 1 to 3 percent reduction in employment
among teenagers—a finding that has led to calls by some in both acad-
emic and policy circles for the use of subminimum wages for teenagers
( N o rdlund 1997). However, even among re s e a rchers who accept these
Linking the Minimum Wage to Pro d u c t i v i t y
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
PPB No.42  2/18/99  2:46 PM  Page 9Automatic Adjustment of the Minimum Wa g e
Public Policy Brief 10
Table 1  Minimum Wage and Average Hourly Wa g e
Minimum Wage  Minimum Wage
Average  as Percentage   Yearly Income
Minimum Hourly of Average as Percentage of
Year Wage Wage Hourly Wage Poverty Line
a
1963
b 1.25 2.28 54.8 100.6
1964 1.25 2.36 53.0 105.1
1965 1.25 2.46 50.8 103.1
1966 1.25 2.56 48.8 100.5
1967
b 1.40 2.68 52.2 109.4
1968
b 1.60 2.85 56.1 120.0
1969 1.60 3.04 52.6 113.8
1970 1.60 3.23 49.6 107.4
1971 1.60 3.45 46.4 103.1
1972 1.60 3.70 43.2 99.7
1973 1.60 3.94 40.6 93.8
1974
b 2.00 4.24 47.2 105.7
1975
b 2.10 4.53 46.4 101.7
1976
b 2.30 4.86 47.3 105.4
1977 2.30 5.25 43.8 99.1
1978
b 2.65 5.69 46.6 106.0
1979
b 2.90 6.16 47.1 104.3
1980
b 3.10 6.66 46.5 98.2
1981
b 3.35 7.25 46.2 96.1
1982 3.35 7.68 43.6 90.6
1983 3.35 8.02 41.8 87.8
1984 3.35 8.32 40.3 84.2
1985 3.35 8.57 39.1 81.3
1986 3.35 8.76 38.2 79.8
1987 3.35 8.98 37.3 76.9
1988 3.35 9.28 36.1 73.9
1989 3.35 9.66 34.7 70.5
1990
b 3.80 10.01 38.0 75.9 
1991
b 4.25 10.32 41.2 81.4
1992 4.25 10.70 39.7 79.0
1993 4.25 10.96 38.8 76.7
1994 4.25 11.26 37.7 74.8
1995 4.25 11.60 36.6 72.7
1996
b 4.70 11.81 39.8 78.1
1997
b 5.15 12.17
c 42.3  NA
a These percentages are author’s calculations based on the poverty rate for a family of three. The
percentage for a single minimum-wage earner would, of course, be higher and that for a family of
four would always be lower.
bYears in which increases in the minimum wage took effect.
cEstimate based on a 3.0 percent increase. 
S o u rc e : U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration; Bureau of Labor
Statistics, “History of the Federal Minimum Wage Rates Under the Fair Labor Standards Act—
1938 Through 1991,” Current Employment Statistics, Labstat Series Report, Series EEU00500006;
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Poverty Tables, Table 1,
“ Weighted Average Poverty Thresholds for Families of Specified Sizes: 1959–1996,”
http:/www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov1.html.
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findings as sound, some concede that the  effects are perh a p s
p ro p o rtionately smaller among 20 to 24 year olds (Neumark and
Wascher 1992) and that adults on balance appear to be better off with a
wage floor. Yet, despite the admittedly smaller effects among adults,
researchers have not made them the focus of much study.
The empirical research that has been done has been consistent with a
model of competitive markets that appears to lead to the conclusion that
the costs to society of raising nominal minimum wages are greater than
any benefits. This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that
market-clearing wages are achieved when the demand for labor is exactly
equal to the supply of labor. All those willing and able to work at that
wage (the equilibrium wage) will be employed and so, by definition,
there is no unemployment. At wages higher than the equilibrium wage,
more people will be willing to work than firms will want to hire and so
the wage will fall, thereby inducing firms to hire more workers and some
workers to drop out of the workforce, with the result that the supply of
labor once again equals the demand for labor. Conversely, at wages
below the equilibrium wage, fewer people will be willing to work than
firms want to hire and the wage will rise, inducing more workers to enter
the workforce, but reducing the number of people firms are willing to
hire until supply and demand are once again equal.
According to the competitive markets model, each worker receives the
value of his or her marginal product. (The value of the marginal product
of labor is the amount of increased revenues that result from an addi-
tional unit of labor.) If adding an additional worker results in a greater
rise in total revenues than when the previous worker was added, then
the firm’s productivity rises by adding that worker. A wage floor, such as
a mandated minimum wage, prevents the cost of labor from dro p p i n g
below a set rate. If the minimum wage is higher than the equilibrium
wage, fewer workers will be hired than are willing to work; that is, there
is unemployment.
1 A minimum wage higher than the equilibrium wage
will result either in lay offs of workers whose value is less than the
minimum or an increase in productivity among low-efficiency workers to
justify their retention by firms (Stigler 1946).
2
A c c o rding to this model, then, the minimum wage could end up hurt i n g
low-wage workers—precisely those people it was intended to help. As the
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cost of labor increases due to a mandated minimum wage that is higher
than the market-clearing wage, firms will hire fewer workers and employ-
ment will drop. Only if the demand for goods and services increases can it
be expected that there will be an increase in the demand for labor, which
will in turn bid up wages and raise the equilibrium wage. A minimum
wage, then, can benefit those who receive it but at a cost to those who
lose their jobs (and are unable to find other jobs) because employers do
not believe the value of their work to be worth the new minimum wage.
A policy that artificially raises wages to help some at the expense of
others is inefficient. Even if there appears to be some benefit from an
i n c rease, the model of competitive markets predicts that there are
inevitably costs, whether in the form of lost jobs, lost opportunities for
jobs, lost benefits, or the demand for increased output per hour worked
(the demand for higher productivity). Employers will save money by
laying off current workers, not creating new jobs, cutting fringe benefits,
or demanding that their workers do more for their new wages.
The problem with the competitive model is that it is a theore t i c a l
c o n s t ruct with characteristics that do not exist in the real world.
Although according to the model a minimum wage set higher than the
equilibrium wage is inefficient because it leads to an underutilization of
labor in the aggregate, the model nonetheless fails to address the
consequences of a world in which wages could be allowed to drop to
the level at which demand will equal supply. In the real world the
minimum wage is likely to affect diff e rent people diff e re n t l y. More o v e r,
the model of competitive markets assumes the minimum wage to be
beside the point because the model does not posit the source of low
wages to be the result of, for example, distorted market power, but fail-
ings of individuals. According to the model, low-wage earners are not
w o rth more than the wages they have been receiving. It is up to them
to improve themselves, and a minimum wage cannot solve this
p roblem. All that a minimum can do is artificially inflate wages,
t h e reby absolving low-wage workers of their responsibility for them-
selves. The model totally ignores structural variables that may aff e c t
wage-setting mechanisms or individual behavior. The pro b l e m ,
h o w e v e r, is that because much of the re s e a rch on the youth labor
market has used the competitive model as its framework, the potential
benefits that might have accrued specifically to the working poor have
been obscured (Levitan and Belous 1979).
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P resenting evidence that contradicts much of the re s e a rch in this are a ,
David Card and Alan Krueger (1995) found that increases in the minimum
wage do not necessarily have a disemployment effect and may actually lead
to higher levels of employment. More o v e r, they suggest that the minimum
wage has perhaps been kept artificially low because of labor monopsony,
that is, the existence of a single principal employer in a particular industry
or labor market. Specifically, in studies of the fast-food industry in
C a l i f o rnia and New Jersey, Card and Krueger found there to be little disem-
ployment resulting from an increase in the minimum wage. Californ i a
i n c reased its state minimum wage from $3.35 (then the prevailing federal
minimum) to $4.25 in July of 1988, and the overall unemployment rate fell
f rom 5.8 percent in 1987 to 5.1 percent (a 12.1 percent drop) in 1989.
During the same period the national rate fell from 6.2 to 5.3 percent (a 14.5
p e rcent drop). Although this would suggest that economic growth in
C a l i f o rnia was similar to, or maybe slightly greater than, growth in the re s t
of the nation, the pattern was quite diff e rent for California teenagers. For
teenagers the unemployment rate fell 3.0 percentage points (17.8 perc e n t )
between 1987 and 1989 from 16.9 to 13.9 percent, but the average U.S.
rate fell only 1.9 percentage points (11.2 percent) from 16.9 to 15.0
p e rcent. The rise in the minimum wage raised the earnings of low-wage
workers with no concurrent decline in employment. 
C a rd and Krueger also studied the effects of New Jersey’s minimum
wage increase, again in the fast-food industry. Because neighboring
Pennsylvania did not raise its minimum wage, they were able to use
f a s t - f o od restaurants there as a control group. Following an increase in
the New Jersey minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.05, the average
s t a rting wage at fast-food restaurants in New Jersey increased by 10
p e rcent. There was no apparent “spillover” effect on high-wage re s t a u-
rants. Quite the contrary: within New Jersey, employment expanded at
low-wage restaurants (those that had been paying $4.25 per hour) and
contracted at high-wage restaurants (those that had been paying $5.00
or more per hour). Employment also contracted between Febru a ry and
November 1992 at fast-food restaurants that were unaffected by the rise
in the minimum wage—those stores in Pennsylvania and New Jersey
paying $5.00 or more per hour. More o v e r, there did not appear to be
any substitution effect. Although the minimum wage increase did lead
to price increases for meals (suggesting that the costs of the incre a s e
w e re simply passed on to the consumer), there was no evidence that
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prices rose faster among restaurants in New Jersey that were most
a ffected by the rise in the minimum wage. Also, the rise in the
minimum wage did not negatively affect the number of restaurant open-
ings, and, as in California, it had no disemployment effect (Card and
K rueger 1995).
The Card and Krueger studies, however, have been controversial and
have raised a host of re s e a rch questions about the quality of available
data and issues of measurement. An important, but often neglected,
subtext to the whole minimum wage debate is that we do not have suffi-
cient data to make any definitive statements about the minimum wage
or its actual effects, whether they be positive or negative. Charles Brown
(1988) has suggested that the minimum wage is overrated by both critics
and supporters alike. Since 1985 minimum-wage earners have accounted
for less than 10 percent of total employment (Table 2) and curre n t l y
account for less than 5 percent of total wage and salary income. The
reduction in employment in the standard model of competitive markets
isn’t necessarily accomplished by the discharge of any number of workers
due to higher wage, but by not hiring workers to replace those who have
voluntarily quit (turnover rates in minimum-wage jobs are on the order
of 12 to 15 percent per month). 
F u rther complicating empirical estimates of the effects of the minimum
wage on employment is the fact that the Fair Labor Standards Act
exempted some employers from paying the minimum. Those exempted
w e re generally smaller firms, with the standard of “smallness” gradually
being tightened over time. Indeed, the original legislation exempted more
f i rms than it included in order to obtain the support of southern politi-
cians, who were generally opposed to a minimum because wages in the
South were considerably lower than in the North (Nordlund 1997). As of
1988, the uncovered sector consisted mostly of retail trade and serv i c e
employees. From Bro w n ’s perspective, because the minimum wage bene-
fits only a small pro p o rtion of the labor market, its potential benefits do
not justify incurring the possible deleterious effects (Brown 1988).
O r, as John Kennan (1995) has suggested (specifically in response to
C a rd and Krueger), we simply do not know that there would not be
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adverse consequences were the minimum wage to increase beyond a
certain threshold. Moreover, it is unlikely that we could find out even if
we were to employ a more sophisticated methodology on the existing
b ody of data; what is needed is more sophisticated data. Some
re s e a rchers suggest that past increases in the minimum wage may not
have had the consequences predicted by the competitive model because
the current minimum wage is still far below the equilibrium wage
(Freeman and Freeman 1991; Gordon 1995).
Another issue is whether the minimum wage as such re p resents an
adequate measure of well-being. Even if raising the minimum does not
result in a real disemployment effect, the increase would be larg e l y
beside the point if the wage still does not lift people out of povert y
( B u r k h a u s e r, Couch, and Wi t t e n b u rg 1996). This type of criticism
supports the contention that there are policy considerations to take into
account other than the possibility of a disemployment effect.
Table 2 Minimum-Wage Earners as a Percentage of All Workers
Paid an Hourly Wage 
Year Both Sexes Men Women 
1979 13.3 7.7 20.2
1980 15.1 9.6 21.6
1981 15.1  9.6 21.2
1982 12.8  8.6 17.3 
1983 12.2 8.4 16.4
1984 11.0 7.5 14.8
1985 9.9  6.9 13.2
1986 8.8  6.9 11.9
1987 7.9 5.4 10.5
1988 6.5  4.4 8.6
1989 5.1  3.5 6.7
1990 5.1  3.3 7.0
1991 9.3  6.7 11.8
1992 7.6  5.7 9.5
1993 6.6 5.0 8.2
1994 6.2  4.7 7.8
S o u rce: Data from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpublished
tabulations from the Current Population Survey, Table 9.
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A rguments for Increasing the Minimum Wa g e
David Gordon (1996) has argued that the notion that the minimum
wage benefits only a small segment of the labor market is true only if the
minimum wage is viewed solely in terms of those who earn it. Most
conventional estimates look only at those earning the real minimum
wage (that is, the actual minimum wage adjusted for inflation) at one
point in time. A decline in the real value of the minimum wage,
however, affects not only those workers who earn at or below the wage,
but those earning in between the point where the minimum used to be
and where it is at the end of the dip—its decline in value. When viewed
in these terms, a decline in the real minimum wage may be seen as a
contributing factor to what Gordon regards as a wage squeeze in recent
years and the growth in income inequality (Gordon 1996, 214–215).
Tu rned around, then, an increase in the minimum wage, along with
other labor market policies, could have a beneficial effect on the
economy insofar as it would begin to reverse the decline in real wages
and the growth in income inequality, for an increase in the minimum
wage would exert an upward pre s s u re on the wages of those earn i n g
above the new minimum wage in addition to those who were earn i n g
above the old level. As Gordon explains, employers might “be pressured
to pay more to their employees, even if they’re not directly affected by
the statutory increase, simply to ensure that they’re able to continue
hiring and employing the quality of workers they prefer” (1996, 215).
C o n s e q u e n t l y, productivity may rise because employers will attract
higher quality (more diligent) workers.
That there is such ambiguity in the data is good reason in and of itself to
look to the other potential benefits of a minimum wage. As we have
seen, the competitive model posits that an increase in the minimum
wage can result in either layoffs or increases in prod u c t i v i t y. In other
words, increases in the minimum wage can also lead to greater efficiency
through greater productivity. An efficiency argument is not inconsistent
with the competitive markets model; it differs in that it places gre a t e r
emphasis on the potential for greater productivity than on the possibility
of more unemployment. Employers might also realize greater efficiencies
because they will pay less in monitoring costs. This is especially so for
employers concerned about shirking; a higher wage is likely to result in
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less shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). Moreover, employers who are
f o rced to pay higher wages might be forced to find ways to impro v e
productivity (Gordon 1995) because there is a limit to how much they
can pass the costs on to consumers through price increases for fear that
they may lose customers.
More importantly, an efficiency argument calls attention to the fact that
a wage policy expresses a societal pre f e rence. A policy aimed at main-
taining the value of earnings for those at the bottom of the wage scale
represents, on one level, a preference simply for a minimum wage that
remains above some poverty threshold. On another level, it might repre-
sent a preference for a higher-wage economy on the assumption that a
higher wage floor might offer managers incentive to provide the type of
on-the-job training that would make their workers more prod u c t i v e .
Michael Piore and Charles Sabel (1984) have expressed the choice
between a lower- or higher-wage economy as a choice between a low
road or a high road in labor market and production strategy. The low
road essentially assumes a mass production industrial economy in which
most functions can be perf o rmed by cheap and low-skilled workers. If
labor is not cheap at home, work can easily be outsourced to locations
w h e re labor costs are substantially less. The high road, by contrast,
entails developing an innovative information-based economy with a
flexible and high-skilled labor force able to command higher wages. The
skills, and ultimately the productivity, of the labor force are developed
through education and training programs. Although a higher minimum
wage alone could not be the sole path toward a high-wage economy, it
might prod employers to invest in the education and training for their
workers necessary to make them “worth” the higher wage. Such arg u-
ments were quite persuasive during the early part of the century, when
many in industrial mass production were earning anything but a “living
wage.” 
P roductivity is difficult to measure, but as difficult as it is to measure ,
there are reasons to believe that the efficiency argument is correct. The
best indicator is the impact higher wages have had on unionized firms.
R i c h a rd Freeman and James Medoff (1984) have argued that although
many unionized firms may have lower levels of pro f i t a b i l i t y, they
nonetheless have greater efficiency because the wage gains achieved
t h rough collective bargaining have resulted in greater prod u c t i v i t y
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Therefore, despite the reduced profitability for some firms, there are still
some social efficiency gains to be derived from wage and other securities
achieved through collective bargaining agreements.
Higher wages would also lead to greater efficiency because they might
lead to lower levels of turnover. When job turnover is high, employers
are generally reluctant to offer on-the-job training—the type of invest-
ment that might automatically lead to higher levels of prod u c t i v i t y
( F reeman 1994; Lynch 1994). Although the efficiency argument has
received little attention in recent years, it was quite prominent during
the early part of the twentieth century as reformers were struggling to get
states to adopt minimum wage legislation (Prasch 1998, forthcoming).
Historical Background of the Minimum Wage Debate
T h e re is ample historical precedent for arguments of efficiency and
p roductivity as foundations for a new policy that would establish an inde-
pendent mechanism for automatically adjusting the minimum wage.
During the early part of the century many economists, mindful of the
s t a n d a rd theoretical assumptions that a minimum wage might lead to
lower employment, often advocated a minimum wage on the gro u n d s
that it would lead to greater prod u c t i v i t y. They essentially argued the
value of an efficiency wage on the premise that those who were paid more
would be able to maintain themselves better and thus produce more. 
The English economist Sidney Webb argued that a wage floor would be
beneficial to employees and employers alike (Webb 1912). Employers
would most appreciate the security it would provide them against being
u n d e rcut by competitors who sought to pay less than an honest wage.
T h e re was in fact a distinction to be drawn between the fixing and
e n f o rcing of a minimum wage and the fixing and enforcing of a wage.
F rom the standpoint of economic theory, Webb reasoned, there was
nothing in a legal minimum wage that could be calculated to diminish
p rod u c t i v i t y. On the contrary, it would actually increase prod u c t i v i t y.
Universal enforcement of a minimum wage would in no way eliminate
competition for employment; rather it would transfer pre s s u re from one
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element in the bargain to the other. Unregulated employment leads
employers to select the cheapest labor, but not necessarily the best labor;
p re f e rence might be given to the incompetent, the weak, and those with
“bad character.” As a result, productivity will tend to be low and ulti-
mately so, too, will eff i c i e n c y. Hiring the best available candidates would
p romote the aggregate efficiency of the nation’s industry. A legal minimum
wage would increase the productivity of the nation’s industry by making it
m o re likely that the workers who were left unemployed were the least
p roductive members of the workforce. Not only would employers be forc e d
to look for the best workers so as to increase their overall prod u c t i v i t y,
employees would be forced to develop their skills so that they could be
counted among the better class of workers (Webb 1912).
This position was not restricted to the other side of the Atlantic. On this
side John Bates Clark (1913) was arguing that in the absence of a
minimum wage, employers would be likely to choose from the ranks of
the most impoverished men and women because they would be willing to
work for almost any wage. Trade unions would go a long way toward
removing this evil, but in the absence of unions, legislation, specifically a
mandated minimum wage, might remove it. As Clark observed, “Mere
need and helplessness give citizens a certain valid claim on the state,
even though it has done nothing to cause their troubles. Privation that is
traceable to social defects makes a more cogent claim. This, in fact, is the
basis of the demand for minimum wage laws, since the ill-paid workers are
re g a rded as victims of social arrangements” (1913, 294).
Although many in the American business community were opposed to
the imposition of a legal minimum wage on the grounds that it would
re p resent an abridgment of their pro p e rty rights (McSweeney 1913;
B rown 1917), some did support it on the grounds that it would lead to
g reater overall prod u c t i v i t y. One of the most notable supporters in the
business community was Edward Filene. Filene (1923) wrote that one
way of increasing efficiency was for employers to pay wages that would
command higher-quality employees. This would be more efficient because
employers would not have to spend as much time providing direction and
c o rrecting workers’ errors. As to the argument that minimum wages
would drive some businesses out of the state, Filene thought that it was
just as well to let them go. He argued that any business that could not pay
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g o od for the state and there f o re had no right to be in it. Low wages simply
result in employers’ having cheap standards, and cheap standards prod u c e
i n e fficient employees. Employers would not get efficient operation out of
workers who were unintelligent, and workers could not be intelligent if
they did not have enough to live on pro p e r l y.
A c c o rding to Filene, a minimum wage law helps employers as well as
employees. It enables employers to be sure that they will not be undersold
by other employers who cut costs. It keeps employers from having a bod y
of employees who, because they are poorly paid, are unable to be
consumers of the employers’ products. It forces employers to take an
i n t e rest in their employees—to educate them to a level that will make
them worth the higher wage the employers must pay. And a minimum
wage law forces employers to contribute to the community in the sense
that their increased investment in human capital affects the community’s
overall well-being. Even if the wage results in the loss of jobs for a cert a i n
number of people, it is still to the good of the larger community because it
f o rces the state to do its job of providing education and training workers.
The state would feel compelled to provide workers, through education
and training, the skills necessary to make them more productive. To this
extent, the minimum wage would serve to enhance public eff i c i e n c y.
Minimum wage advocates further argued that employers who paid less
than what was necessary to support their labor were essentially parasites
on the community, as the difference would ultimately have to come from
someplace (Lehrer 1987, 77). Or, as H. LaRue Brown (1913) noted,
nothing makes for greater inefficiency than hunger, worry, discontent;
employees able to maintain themselves are sure to be better workers,
and, therefore, a minimum wage has to be seen as part of a great social
advance. Only a few years after the initial minimum wage laws took
e ffect, Arthur Holcombe (1917) observed that the minimum wage
neither led to the replacement of women by men (the initial legislation
applied only to women) nor did it result in any decrease in eff i c i e n c y.
On the contrary, experience suggested that the benefits originally antici-
pated by early advocates were indeed being secured.
The first minimum wage legislation was enacted by states during the early
p a rt of the century and applied only to women. It was believed that men
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women were not allowed to join. Unions originally favored minimum
wage legislation for women, but opposed it for men because they wanted
to encourage voluntary association (Lehrer 1987). Some pro g ressives who
s u p p o rted the minimum wage for women viewed themselves as support e r s
of what they called a “family wage,” the notion that men should be paid a
wage sufficient to support a family and that a woman’s place was in the
home taking care of her family. They believed that since a minimum
wage for women would lead to a greater pre f e rence for men in hiring, it
would shore up the integrity of the family (Kessler- H a rris 1988).
By the time the Fair Labor Standards Act, which applied to both sexes,
took effect in 1938, there were larger economic issues to consider. As
much as the various states may have paved the way for the federal law
with their own minimum wage laws during the Progressive era, the 1938
law was very much a product of the Great Depression. The depression
generated two key problems: high unemployment and depressed wages
and prices. The goal of policy, then, was to generate jobs and inflate
wages and prices (Nordlund 1997). Jobs could be generated, in the name
of putting purchasing power into the hands of potential consumers,
t h rough public works. As consumers demanded goods and serv i c e s ,
prices would eventually begin to rise. Wages could be inflated by legally
sanctioning collective bargaining and by creating a mandatory wage
floor. Although scholars have debated whether or not the New Deal as a
whole was radical, the thinking at the time was actually quite conserva-
tive—the goal was to get business back on its feet (Bernstein 1973). The
New Deal may well have been radical as measured against laissez-faire
s t a n d a rds, but it was conservative in the larger Burkean tradition of
striving to conserve the venerated tradition of capitalism. And as much
as the minimum wage may have been viewed as part of this larger effort
to get business back on track, there were still plenty who opposed it, and
for many of the same reasons it was always opposed.
The FLSA was intended to establish a minimum set of standards that
would ensure that producers in one region of the country would not have
unfair competitive advantage over producers in another because they
w e re either paying substandard wages or working their employees
excessively long hours. There were, however, a number of exemptions
f rom the law. For the most part, it covered only workers engaged in
Linking the Minimum Wage to Pro d u c t i v i t y
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21
PPB No.42  2/18/99  2:46 PM  Page 21g o ods production and interstate commerce; excluded were workers
engaged in local retail sales, intrastate commerce, transportation, and
a g r i c u l t u re. Of course, executive, administrative, and pro f e s s i o n a l
workers were excluded, as it was assumed that their wages were consider-
ably more than the minimum and that the nature of their work was such
that a time clock could not be imposed. What is important to note is
that many of the workers we associate with the lower, if not the lowest,
end of the wage scale were not covered by the FLSA. And those to
whom it did apply were likely to be members of a trade union, in which
case their wages would be higher than the statutory minimum anyway.
Within six months of the passage of the FLSA, Elmer Andrews, the
wage and hours administrator, was proclaiming it a success insofar as it
had become a permanent part of the law of the land. At the same time
he was careful to note that its popularity perhaps derived from the
modesty of the statute, which enabled business to adjust to it. Because of
the law’s limited scope, compliance was the rule, not the exception
( A n d rews 1939). The law did create a major precedent for federal
involvement in wage regulation, but the more important accomplish-
ments were yet to come in the subsequent amendments. 
Regions where wage rates were already higher than the established
s t a t u t o ry minimum, such as nort h e rn parts of the United States, would
not be affected that much; those regions where rates were considerably
l o w e r, particularly in the South, would be. States with lower wage rates
would effectively lose some of their comparative competitive advantage
by having to pay a higher wage rate. That some states enjoyed this
competitive advantage was viewed to be unfair. The minimum wage law
was intended to achieve some measure of fairness by eliminating
regional disparities (Nordlund 1997). At the same time many of the
exemptions appeared to apply to workers who were more likely to be
c o n g regated in the South and the West. In the end, then, consensus
was built on the basis of a law that would be extremely limited in
impact and scope. Most members of the opposition were muted by
limiting the scope to areas and people that would not immediately
a ffect them politically.
Ambivalence about the minimum wage has continued ever since,
affecting any actions on the rate or modifications of how rate increases
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ation—especially one tied to the same cost of living index that other
federal entitlements are tied to—for fear that it would lead to inflation.
Indexation was first introduced during discussions of the 1977 amend-
ments to the FLSA. Organized labor was arguing for an immediate
increase in the minimum wage to 60 percent of the average hourly wage
and for indexation to ensure that it would always remain at 60 percent.
It was believed that not only would indexation assist the working poor,
but it would benefit business by providing stability and a regular pattern
of cost increases (Levitan and Belous 1979). However, whenever indexa-
tion has been suggested, it has had to be abandoned just to obtain the
support for an increase itself. And, as recent history has shown, this crit-
ical failure in policy has resulted in a minimum wage that has failed to
keep up with the rate of inflation.
E ffects of the Minimum Wage on All Wa g e s
William Spriggs and Bruce Klein (1994) found that when the minimum
wage rises, the starting wages of nearly three-fifths of those in entry-level
positions also rise, regardless of whether their jobs actually pay minimum
wages or not. When the minimum wage remains constant, its real value
falls when prices rise. According to Spriggs and Klein’s study, the
minimum wage may be important in affecting employment levels, and it
plays a significant role in determining the wages of America’s workforce,
especially those with only a high school education and those living in
rural areas. This is because firms view the minimum wage as a reference
point for what starting wages ought to be.
Although some evidence suggests that high labor turnover re l a t e s
significantly to increases in unemployment after minimum wage
changes, changes generally do not have a significant effect overall on
employment. Rather, the cost of maintaining a low nominal rate for the
minimum wage during the 1980s was the diminished opportunities for
young adult workers (Spriggs and Klein 1994). Because the value of the
minimum wage fell in real terms, there were fewer opportunities, espe-
cially for those who could qualify only for jobs at the low end, to find
jobs that would enable them to live above the poverty line. If the
minimum wage, as Spriggs and Klein suggest, is taken to be a culturally
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implication might be enormous. Presumably that re f e rence point could
be altered. In other words, is the re f e rence point really a function of
w h e re the market clears or is it set according to some broad consensus
of what it is? The more important implication, however, is the notion
that wages are determined more by structural factors than by competi-
tive markets. 
Those who claim that the low percentage of those earning the minimum
wage is evidence that the minimum wage as an aid to the poor is poorly
targeted often fail to note that in 1979 the percentage of the labor force
earning the minimum wage was more than double what it was in 1994
(refer again to Table 2).
3 What seems to have gotten little notice is that
the declining percentage of hourly workers earning the minimum wage
also appears to coincide with a period when the minimum wage declined
in value, as shown in Table 3. 
If there is a relationship between the declining percentage of minimum-
wage earners and the declining value of the minimum wage, it would
have some critical implications. The fact that fewer people are earn i n g
the minimum wage might be taken as a sign of pro g ress if it is assumed
that fewer minimum-wage earners means that workers have been
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Table 3  Declining Value of the Minimum Wage for Selected Ye a r s
Minimum Wage Minimum Wage 











S o u rce: William E. Spriggs and Bruce W. Klein, Raising the Floor: The Effects of the Minimum
Wage on Low Wage Wo r k e r s ( Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute, 1994), Table 1.1.
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that the decline coincides with the declining value of the minimum
wage, we are left to wonder if perhaps workers earning the minimum wage
d ropped out of the labor force because the minimum wage was inadequate
to maintain some minimum standard of living. Many people, especially
women with children, have been able to receive greater income thro u g h
public assistance programs. If this is true, it would lend support to the
notion that a higher wage, or at least one that more closely appro x i m a t e s
50 percent of the average hourly wage, might attract those at the low end
of the wage scale into the labor market. 
A critical question, given recent changes in the national welfare law, is
how many people would be attracted to the labor market were the wage
set at a level high enough to make work rewarding for many who previ-
ously found public assistance to be more attractive. As a function of the
new law, states have to reduce their welfare rolls by 50 percent by 2002.
Some of this will be done through the creation of work pro g r a m s
intended to assist recipients in job search and in the development of
skills and good work habits. But much of it will be accomplished by
directing as many as possible into the private labor market. Therefore, in
o rder for “work” to be a successful option, it does indeed need to pay
(Bane and Ellwood 1994; Levin-Waldman 1997).
P o l i c y
To make the minimum a living wage would require a serious measure by
C o n g ress. To bring the wage into line with 50 percent of the average
hourly wage would re q u i re an immediate increase of more than 20
p e rcent; a higher percentage increase would be re q u i red for each year
that Congress does nothing about the minimum wage.
4 Herein lies the
political problem that has been driving many of the economic conse-
quences of a declining minimum wage. The larger the increase in the
minimum wage, the more of a shock it is bound to be to the sector of the
economy that hires the most minimum-wage workers. Because of the
immediate shock that would attend a large increase, Congress re s i s t s
voting an increase, and the value of the wage erodes even further. By the
time Congress feels that it can act, because it in fact must act, the
increase it enacts is too little and too late because the value has eroded
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would offer greater stability. 
A minimum wage that maintains its ability to enable individuals to
s u p p o rt a family above the poverty line would re q u i re some mechanism
for automatic annual adjustment. An obvious mechanism would be
indexing the minimum to the consumer price index (CPI), raising
wages by whatever percentage increase there is in the CPI. But for a
variety of reasons, this is not necessarily the path that Congress ought
to take. First of all, studies have shown that the CPI overstates the rate
of inflation (Boskin 1996) and that it does not accurately re f l e c t
market-caused price increases (Papadimitriou and Wray 1996). An
index that increases wages at a rate greater than (or even diff e re n t
f rom) the actual inflation rate will exacerbate inflationary pre s s u res. To
not exacerbate inflationary pre s s u res, increases would have to be
accompanied by productivity gains. (An increase in the wage without a
commensurate increase in productivity would indeed be inflationary. )
T h e re f o re, a minimum wage indexation mechanism tied to prod u c t i v i t y
i n c reases would probably be the wisest policy from the standpoint of
both economic theory and political feasibility. The problem with a
p roductivity index is that productivity is very hard to define, let alone
m e a s u re. Nevertheless, there are a couple of policy approaches that
could be employed that would not re q u i re getting lost in the labyrinth
of a productivity definition.
The first is to tie the minimum wage to a certain percentage of the mean
or median hourly wage; whatever percentage the index wage increases,
the minimum wage increases by the same percentage. For much of its
h i s t o ry the minimum wage hovered around 50 percent of the average
hourly wage. The problem with means as a measure of actual wages is
that they can be skewed by extremes at either end of the spectrum and
reflect the earnings of a few workers who fall close to the top or to the
bottom of the earnings scale. Medians might be a better measure because
they reflect the earnings of the worker at the exact middle of the earn-
ings spectrum. Table 4 shows the actual minimum and what the
minimum wage indexed to the median would have been between 1983
(the first year for which median wage data are available) and 1997. On
the basis of this index, the minimum wage for 1997 would have been
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wage of $5.15. 
It would be preferable to index the minimum wage to the median wage
rather than to the CPI because increases in the median will be a function
either of increasing prices or increasing prod u c t i v i t y, but whatever
i n c reases occur will be the result of employers’ decisions to give raises. The
main drawback to this approach is the apparently arbitrary nature of estab-
lishing the wage rate. Why, after all, assume that a minimum-wage worker
is worth only 50 percent of median-wage workers? The policymaker may
not want to get involved in making judgments about the intrinsic worth of
individuals, but there is historical precedent using this percentage. In the
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Table 4  Minimum Wage Indexed to the Median Hourly Wage 
M e d i a n P e rc e n t I n d e x e d A c t u a l
H o u r l y I n c re a s e M i n i m u m M i n i m u m P e rc e n t
Ye a r Wa g e in Median Wa g e
a Wa g e D i ff e re n c e D i ff e re n c e
1983 7.73 – 3.87 3.35 0.52 1.6
1984 8.10 5.4 4.08 3.35 0.70 2.2
1985 8.58 5.3 4.30 3.35 0.95 28.4
1986 8.95 4.3 4.48 3.35 1.13 33.7 
1987 9.33 5.0 4.70 3.35 1.35 40.3
1988 9.63 3.2 4.85 3.35 1.50 44.8
1989 9.98 3.6 5.02 3.35 1.67 49.9
1990
b 10.38 4.0 5.22 3.80 1.42 37.4
1991
b 10.75 3.6 5.41 4.25 1.16 27.3
1992 11.13 3.5 5.60 4.25 1.35 31.8
1993 11.58 4.0 5.82 4.25 1.57 36.9
1994 11.68 0.9 5.89 4.25 1.63 38.4
1995 11.98 2.6 6.03 4.25 1.78 41.9
1996
b 12.25 2.3 6.17 4.70 1.47 31.3
1997
b 12.62
c 3.0 6.36 5.15 1.21 23.5 
aThe 1983 indexed minimum wage is calculated as 50 percent of the median hourly wage.
The indexed minimum wage for the following years increases by the same percentage as
the median. 
bYears in which increases in the statutory minimum wage took effect.
cThe figure for 1997 is an estimate based on a 3.0 percent increase. 
S o u rc e : A u t h o r’s calculations based on data in unpublished tables from the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics for the years 1983 to 1996.
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w h e re between 50 and 55 percent (refer again to Table 1).
A second approach to the adjustment problem would be to look at the
median of the lowest-wage workers in the United States. These are
primarily the people in the low-skill jobs, such as jobs in the food service
and retail sales sector of the economy. The median wage of low-skilled
workers could serve as a reference point for a minimum and, for all prac-
tical purposes, could be taken as the putative minimum wage. This,
would, of course, have implications for the statutory minimum wage.
Again, whatever percentage increase there was in the putative minimum
wage would simply be applied to the statutory minimum wage. Again, it
would be assumed that increases in the putative minimum wage are
based on productivity increases, which ultimately means that instead of
the govern m e n t ’s deciding on the rate of increase, the private sector
would be doing so. This, in turn, is based on the assumption that the
private sector is in a better position to make determinations of produc-
tivity increases. 
Table 5 shows the results of this approach had we instituted this indexa-
tion scheme in 1983 taking the statutory minimum wage then as a
s t a rting point and increasing it by percentage increases in the median
lowest-sector wage. Although the 1997 indexed wage would not have
been much higher than the minimum in that year and would not have
o ff e red much assistance to low-wage workers, it would have had the
advantage of changing gradually and re g u l a r l y, which would have
removed the shock attendant to most increases set by current pro c e-
d u res. A virtue of using the median low-skilled wage rather than the
median wage is that since most people taking minimum-wage jobs are
going to be working in the lowest-wage sector of the economy, it seems
reasonable to allow that sector to have the greatest say (through its
wage increases based on productivity levels) on increases to be applied
to the statutory minimum wage. Even though minimum-wage workers
would not have been much better off than they are under the curre n t
s t a t u t o ry minimum wage, they would have seen increases in their earn-
ings in past years (where diff e rences are somewhat larger) and experi-
enced a slowdown in the decline in the value of their wages that occurs
when Congress waits to take action and then does too little. An
indexed minimum wage can work hand-in-hand with the new 
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moving welfare recipients into the labor market and keeping them
t h e re, these people need to see tangible evidence that their earn i n g s
will grow and that “work” can ultimately pay.
Although it would be quite a jump to raise the minimum wage from its
current $5.15 to the lowest-wage sector median of $7.29, policymakers
should consider establishing an indexed wage initially set at that level.
Were the severity of the initial increase to pose a hardship for employers,
p e rhaps short - t e rm subsidies could be off e red to help defray the initial
costs. These subsidies could be paid for by savings from the EITC,
because at a wage of $7.29 an hour, many would earn incomes that
would exceed the current maximum value of the EITC. The EITC costs
about $25 billion a year, and the savings from its elimination could
p e rhaps be re t u rned to employers in the form of tax cuts or other 
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Table 5 Minimum Wage Indexed to the Median Hourly Wage of the Lowest-
Wage Sector
Median Hourly 
Wage of  P e rc e n t I n d e x e d A c t u a l
L o w e s t - Wa g e I n c re a s e Minimum  M i n i m u m P e rc e n t
Ye a r S e c t o r in Median Wa g e Wa g e D i ff e re n c e D i ff e re n c e
1 9 8 3 4 . 7 0 — — 3 . 3 5 — —
1 9 8 4 5.00  6 . 4 3 . 5 6 3 . 3 5 0 . 2 1 6 . 3
1 9 8 5 5 . 0 0 — 3 . 5 6 3 . 3 5 0 . 2 1 6.3 
1 9 8 6 5 . 1 3 2 . 6 3 . 6 5 3 . 3 5 0 . 3 0 9 . 0
1 9 8 7 5 . 3 3 3 . 9 3 . 7 9 3 . 3 5 0 . 4 4 1 3 . 1
1 9 8 8 5.53  3.8  3 . 9 3 3 . 3 5 0 . 5 8 1 7 . 3
1 9 8 9 5 . 7 5 4 . 0 4 . 0 9 3 . 3 5 0 . 7 0 2 0 . 9
1 9 9 0
a 6 . 1 3 6 . 6 4 . 3 6 3 . 8 0 0 . 5 6 1 4 . 7
1 9 9 1
a 6 . 4 0 4 . 4 4 . 5 5 4 . 2 5 0 . 3 0 7 . 1
1 9 9 2 6 . 4 8 1 . 3 4 . 6 1 4 . 2 5 0 . 3 6 8 . 5
1 9 9 3 6 . 6 8 3 . 1 4 . 7 8 4 . 2 5 0 . 5 3 1 2 . 5
1 9 9 4 6 . 6 8 — 4 . 7 8 4 . 2 5 0 . 5 3 1 2 . 5
1 9 9 5 6 . 8 5 2 . 5 4 . 9 0 4 . 2 5 0 . 6 5 15.3 
1 9 9 6
a 7 . 0 8 3 . 4 5 . 0 6 4.70  0 . 3 6 7 . 7
1 9 9 7
a 7 . 2 9
b 3 . 0 5.21  5 . 1 5 0 . 0 6 1 . 2
aYears in which increases in the statutory minimum wage took effect.
bThe figure for 1997 is an estimate based on a 3.0 percent increase. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in unpublished tables from the U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the years 1983 to 1996.
PPB No.42  2/18/99  2:46 PM  Page 29subsidies as a way of compensating for the increased wages they would
have to pay (Levin-Waldman 1995). Although a higher income could be
given to workers at the low end simply by raising the level at which the
EITC phases out, workers may still be more loyal to their employers, and
hence more productive, when they receive all their income from their
employers. When workers in effect receive a percent of their income
through government subsidy, they may not have the same incentive to
work as hard as when all their income comes from their employers.
Policymakers and employers should also keep in mind that the gre a t e r
loyalty that higher wages engender among employees could be a gre a t
benefit, as it would lead to higher productivity.
C o n c l u s i o n
R e g a rdless of which approach to establishing an automatic adjustment
mechanism is taken, the effect would be to create a public-private part-
nership in which government implements a new wage rate based on
what is happening in the private sector. The decision of how much to
raise the minimum wage would be made on the basis of a consensus
a rrived at through the collectivity of private decisions, instead of its
being made by government.
Critics of indexation schemes often claim that such measures are infla-
t i o n a ry. But, because in our lowest-wage sector scheme the statutory
minimum wage is so far below the putative minimum wage of the lowest-
wage sector and because such a small percentage of the workforce (6.2
p e rcent in 1994) actually is paid the minimum, it is hard to see how
increasing the minimum wage at the same rate that the median lowest
wage is increasing could exert much inflationary pre s s u re. Annual
increases in the minimum wage would actually reduce much of the shock
that many employers of minimum-wage workers are said to experience
each time Congress actually does implement a new minimum wage.
Congress has at times had to increase the wage by as much as 25 percent
just to bring it to about 50 percent of the average hourly wage, which in
most cases left it below that percentage of the median hourly wage. And
even when the minimum wage was raised to a level that was below 50
Automatic Adjustment of the Minimum Wa g e
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ably larger than any increase mandated through an indexation mecha-
nism. Wo u l d n ’t gradual increases have less impact on a firm ’s cost
structure? And even if the minimum-wage worker were so fortunate as to
obtain as much as an 11 percent increase, under an adjustment scheme
tied to a median wage that increase could be in part a function of higher
p roductivity levels, not a form of largess that re w a rds ineff i c i e n c y.
Gradual increases would reduce the shock because their impact on firms’
cost structures would be relatively minimal.
U l t i m a t e l y, the whole question of indexation re q u i res us to revisit the
economic theory that holds that increases in the minimum wage lead to
lower employment. Is lower employment a function of the increase per
se or is it a function of the size of the increase? Automatic indexation
would remove the issue from politics and ensure that those at the low
end of the wage scale can continue to earn a wage that keeps up. A
better wage might also reduce turnover in minimum-wage jobs and give
employers more incentive to invest in on-the-job training, which will
lead to greater productivity.
N o t e s
1. The competitive model assumes that firms typically use the marginal product
of labor as a criterion for determining how many workers to hire. Specifically,
the firm will hire workers until the cost of hiring one more worker (the wage)
equals the revenue derived from selling the last worker’s output (marg i n a l
product of labor x price of output).
2. Employers increase productivity by increasing hours, reducing benefits,
adopting new technologies, hiring more skilled workers, and training workers.
Workers attempt to increase their productivity (to remain marketable) by
working more hours, acquiring skills, and working at a faster pace in order to
achieve more output in less time.
3. Although the percentage of women earning the minimum wage was higher
than the percentage of men earning the minimum in all years from 1979 to
1994, the size of the gap between men and women narrows from 12.5
percentage points (20.2 for women and 7.7 for men) in 1979 to 3.1 percentage
points (7.8 for women and 4.7 for men) in 1994.
4. The estimate of more than 20 percent is based on the assumption that the
average hourly wage of $11.81 for 1996 would have increased by 3.0 percent
for both 1997 and 1998, yielding an average annual wage of $12.54 by 1998.
The minimum wage of $5.15 (in 1998) is about 40 percent of the average
hourly wage. Were Congress to take another year or two to act, the minimum
wage would fall that much further behind.
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